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STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
Section 34-35-7.1 Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim -
Investigations - Adjudicative proceedings - Settlement 
Reconsideration - Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, 
his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file with the 
commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under 
oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall 
be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship 
committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who 
refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with the provisions of this 
chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action 
asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by 
conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an 
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by 
conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make 
a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the 
request for agency action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall 
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies 
involved, and may not attempt a settlement between the parties if 
it is clear that no discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice has occurred. 
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(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for 
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final 
order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence 
during his investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the 
request for cigency action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findincjs to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director 
may issue ci determination and order for dismissal of the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and order 
for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, 
the determination and order issued by the director becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful 
and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his 
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice set out in the request for agency 
action, the investigator shall formally report these findings to 
the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director 
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's 
report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and 
order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, 
the determination and order issued by the director requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who 
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing except as 
a witness, nor may he participate in the deliberations of the 
presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party 
filing the request for agency action may reasonably and fairly 
amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend its answer. 
Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but only 
with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall 
issue an order dismissing the request for agency action containing 
the allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice. 
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(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be 
reimbursed by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue 
an order requiring the respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the 
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, 
and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and 
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of 
the order issued by the presiding officer in accordance with 
Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued 
by the presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is 
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules 
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not 
divulge or make public any information gained from any 
investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the 
commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any 
determination may be provided to all interested parties for the 
purpose of preparation for and participation in proceedings before 
the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided 
the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the 
attorney general or other legal representatives of the state or 
commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and 
reporting requirements of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination 
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for 
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before 
the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same 
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended 
to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision 
set forth in Subsection (15). 
Section 63-46b-l Scope and applicability of chapter. 
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(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2) , and except as 
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this 
chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of 
this chapter apply to every agency of the state of Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, 
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or 
more identifiable persons, including all agency actions to grant, 
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an 
authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern: 
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency rules, or the 
judicial review of those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment 
of a tax, the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the 
imposition of, and penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance 
of any tax assessment, except that the provisions of this chapter 
govern any agency action commenced by a taxpayer or by another 
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of 
those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the 
granting of pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of 
sentences, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation of 
parole or probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board relating to discharge, conditional release, 
or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline 
of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or 
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, 
the Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or 
persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental 
Health, or persons on probation or parole, or judicial review of 
those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, 
transfer, reassign, or promote students or teachers in any school 
or educational institution, or judicial review of those actions; 
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel 
actions within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial 
review of those actions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 
35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, and 
Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, 
except that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action 
commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person authorized by 
law to contest the validity or correctness of such a citation or 
assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state 
funds, and contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real 
property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the state# or by 
or for an agency of the state, except as provided in such 
contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, 
Powers and Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and 
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Title 7, Chapter 2, Possession of Depository Institution by 
Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan Corporation 
Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19, Acquisition of Failing 
Depository Institutions or Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter 
30, Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, the initial determination of any person's 
eligibility for benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's 
Compensation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Law, or the initial determination of a person's 
unemployment tax liability; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or 
award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for 
research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those 
actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under 
Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act, 
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act, or 
Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except 
that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action 
commenced by any person authorized by law to contest the validity 
or correctness of any such notice or order; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal 
statute or regulation to be conducted according to federal 
procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
government or public assistance benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, 
permits, tags, and certificates of registration; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act, except as provided in 
Section 63-2-603. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any legal 
remedies otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the 
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer 
during an adjudicative proceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and 
interested persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, 
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the 
moving party, except to the extent that the requirements of those 
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rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 
63-4 6b-21 are not governed by this chapter, except as explicitly 
provided in that section, 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by 
Section 63-4 6b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting 
rules affecting or governing adjudicative proceedings or from 
following any of those rules, if the rules are enacted according to 
the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination 
that any provision of this chapter would result in the denial of 
funds or services to an agency of the state from the federal 
government, the applicability of those provisions to that agency 
shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial. 
The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature 
at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an 
independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a 
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or 
shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
Section 63-46b-12 Agency review - Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to 
any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the 
agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a 
written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of the 
order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the 
statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each 
party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for 
review, or within the time period provided by agency rule, 
whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the person 
designated by statute or rule to receive the response. One copy of 
the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and to 
the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency7s rules require review of an 
order by the agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior 
agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within 
the time required by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by 
order or rule permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or 
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to conduct ora1 argument. • 
(5) Notice of hearings < review shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any 
response, other filings, or oral argument, or within the time 
required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior 
agency shall issue a written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or 
by a person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be 
mailed to each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i ) a designation of the statute or ru] e permitting or 
requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or 
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or 
any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(viI) a notice of any right of further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review avai1ab]e to aggrieved parties; 
and 
(vi ii) tl le time limits applicable t<« any appeal or review. 
Sectioi i 63 4 6b-jl .3 Agei ) • • •.,:**•. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued 
for which review by the agency or by a superior agency under 
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise 
constitute final agency action, any party may file a written 
request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific 
grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the 
request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the 
order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the 
agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the 
person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that 
purpose, shall issue a written order granting the request or 
denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that 
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of 
the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to 
be denied 
Section 63 46b-3 I Judicial review Exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute. 
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(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states 
that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the* court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of 
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable 
harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion, 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of 
final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to 
have been issued under Subsection 63~46b-13(3) (b) . 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form 
requirements specified in this chapter. 
Section 63-46b-16 Judicial review - Formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the 
appellate court. 
(3) The* contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency7s 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing 
transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate 
to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by 
any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
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resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously i nterpreted or a/j: »pJ i ed the 
law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the coi--
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency 
statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency,s prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Section 63-46b-18 Judicial review - Stay and other temporary 
remedies pending final disposition. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant 
a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency 
of judicial review, according to the agency7s rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other 
temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require 
immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary 
remedies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall 
be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why the stay 
or other temporary remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy 
to protect the public health, safety, or welfare against a 
substantial threat, the court may not grant a stay or other 
temporary remedy unless it finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail 
on the merits when the court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will s= ~i 
irreparable injury without immediate relief; 
(:i i i) granting relief to the party seeking review will not 
substantially harm other parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare 
relied upon by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify 
the agency's action under the circumstances. 
Rules 
R560-1-5 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o i Pi. oi/ieoci i iitj 1 OJ I'urpoflu of 111 dli 
Administrat ive Procedures Act . 
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The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.1(6) -(10) , U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing which 
shall occur following the investigation process referred to in 
Section 34-35-7.1(1)-(5), U.C.A. The formal hearing shall be held 
after the Director sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to 
the Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by 
Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been satisfied and that a formal 
hearing is necessary to finally resolve the matter and when it is 
appropriate pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R568-1-5 Allowance for Mailing. 
A. Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting some 
action on behalf of a party is served on a party by mail, three 
days shall be added to the prescribed period as allowed under Rule 
6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This three day extension 
does not apply to notices sent by registered mail as required by 
Sections 35-1-46(3) and 35-1-46.30(2), U.C.A. 
URAP 3 Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may 
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by 
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any 
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as 
well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are 
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are 
such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice 
of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing 
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a 
single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or 
upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be 
known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The 
title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the 
appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, 
the party mciking the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall 
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate 
the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the 
court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal 
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shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each 
party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented 
by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address, 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of 
filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil 
case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the 
trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also 
the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal un]ess the 
filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing :>f appeal. Upon the fil i ng of the noti ce of appeal 
and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court 
shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, 
showing the date of its filing, together with the docketing fee., to 
the.clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, 
with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not 
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the 
title. 
URAP I Appeal a:s of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an 
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to 
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall 
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when 
a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any 
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not ai i 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) 
under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties 
shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely 
motion under the -Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the 
trial court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) 
under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the 
substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial 
or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal 
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shdll have 
no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial 
court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
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(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as 
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed 
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before 
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is 
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal 
was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) 
of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing 
a notice of cippeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may 
be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of 
the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the 
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
URAP 8 Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in the first instance in trial 
court; motion for stay in appellate court. Application for a stay 
of the judgment or order of a trial court pending appeal, or 
disposition of a petition under Rule 5, or for approval of a 
supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, 
or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must 
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the trial court• A 
motion for such relief may be made to the appellate court, but the 
motion shall show that application to the trial court for the 
relief sought is not practicable, or that the trial court has 
denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the 
applicant requested, with the reasons given by the trial court for 
its action. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief 
requested and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject 
to dispute, the motion shall be supported by affidavits or other 
sworn statements or copies thereof. With the motion shall be filed 
such parts of the record as are relevant. Reasonable notice of the 
motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed 
with the clerk and normally will be considered by the court, but in 
exceptional cases where such procedure would be impracticable due 
to the requirements of time, the application may be considered by 
a single justice or judge of the court. 
(b) Stay may be conditioned upon giving of bond. Relief available 
in the appellate court under this rule may be conditioned upon the 
filing of a bond or other appropriate security in the trial.court. 
(c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal cases "pending 
appeal are governed by Rule 27, U.R.Crim.P. 
URAP 24 Briefs. 
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(a) Brief -of. -the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, 
except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties- The list should be set 01it on a separate page 
which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged 
and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited 
(4) A brief • .t <i t om< iit showinq I hij jurisdiction ol 1 liu 
appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the 
standard of appellate review for each issue with supporting 
authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set 
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and 
in that event, the provision shall be set forth as provided in 
paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record (see paragraph (e)). 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments 
actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere 
repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except 
that a statement of the issues or of the case need not be made 
unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the 
brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the 
appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave "of the 
appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in 
their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to 
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parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It 
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or 
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person," 
"the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made 
to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits 
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, regulations, 
documents, etc. 
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, or order pertaining to the issues on appeal and 
any jury instructions or other part of the record of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal shall be reproduced 
in the brief or in an addendum to the brief. 
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the 
study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts 
thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of 
this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum 
at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, 
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall 
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, 
rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is 
filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed 
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the 
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of 
the appellee shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the 
cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. 
In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including 
cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either 
may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt 
by reference* any part of the brief of another. Parties may 
similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and 
significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that 
party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original" letter 
and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. 
There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a 
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point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall without argument state the reasons for the supplemental 
citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must 
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and 
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
URCP 5 Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these 
rules, every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court 
otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper 
relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the 
court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, 
demand, offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d), and similar paper shall be served upon each of 
the parties. No service need be made on parties in default for 
failure to appear except as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default 
proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims for 
relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner 
provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through 
arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no 
person need be or is named as defendant, any service required to be 
made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be 
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property 
at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the 
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the 
party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or 
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by 
mailing it to him at his known address or, if no address is known, 
by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy 
within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; 
or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in 
charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the 
person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers 
may be Served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any 
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foreign attorney practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there 
are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion 
or of its own initiative, may order that service of the pleadings 
of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between 
the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein 
shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties and 
that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties* A copy of 
every such order shall be served upon the parties in such manner 
and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served 
upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or 
within a reasonable time thereafter, but the court may upon motion 
of a party or on its own initiative order that depositions, 
interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, 
and answers cind responses thereto not be filed unless on order of 
the court or for use in the proceeding. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and 
other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be 
made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the 
judge may permit the papers to be filed with him, in which event he 
shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to 
the office of the clerk, if any. 
URCP 6 Time,. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or 
allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, 
by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time 
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of the court an act is required or allowed 
to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown 
may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or 
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of 
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to 
act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and 
(e) , 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under the 
conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided 
for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not 
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affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a 
term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of 
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act or take 
any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before 
it. 
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof 
shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or 
by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on 
ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the 
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise 
provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be 
served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has 
the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings 
within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other 
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 
3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) concurs with 
Maverik Country Stores, Inc. that if its appeals and motions for 
review were timely filed that jurisdiction exists under the 
statutes cited. Rules 3 and 4 (Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure) 
relate to trial courts, and therefore do not seem to be 
appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Maverik has stated four issues which largely relate to 
jurisdiction of the Commission, exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, and finality of its orders. The Commission will restate 
them. 
I. Was the June 26, 1991 order of the administrative law 
judge (ALJ) a final order allowing Maverik to appeal to this Court 
without requesting review of the ALJ's order by the full 
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Commission, and even though some matters had been reserved for 
further briefing and resolution by the ALJ? This is an issue of 
law requiring a correction of error standard. Cross v. Ind. Comm'n 
et al.f 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. Jan. 29, 1992). 
II. Assuming the Commission had jurisdiction, was the 
"filing" of a request for review complete upon mailing? This is an 
issue of law requiring a correction of error standard. Id. 
III. Assuming that the Commission had jurisdiction, that 
mailing the request was insufficient, and that the Commission 
abused its discretion in failing to grant a one business day 
extension to file Maverik's request for review, did the 
Commissions action in reviewing all of Maverik's claims render 
this error hcirmless? The Commission concurs with Maverik that the 
Commission should be deferred to unless it abused its discretion. 
Nucor Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. May 18, 1992). 
IV. Were any of the subsequent orders of the Commission final 
within the meaning of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14 (1953 as amended 
1988)? This is an issue of law requiring a correction of error 
standard. Cross, supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. The first case of the cases consolidated for this argument 
involve a situation where the Petitioner/Appellant Maverik Country 
Stores, Incorporated (Maverik) appealed to this Court on July 26, 
1991 while the case had not been completed, matters were still 
pending before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Commission, 
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and before Maverik had exhausted its administrative remedies within 
the Commission, The second case involves Maverik's request for 
review on October 10, 1991, and its two requests for 
reconsideration which were filed on March 19, 1992, and April 6, 
1992, respectively. 
b. This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an ALJ, and the 
request was granted. As a result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and an Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 
1991. Appendix A. On September 10, 1991 the ALJ issued a 
supplemental order dealing with attorney fees. Appendix B. On 
October 11, 1991, the respondent requested review by the Industrial 
Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and September 10, 
1991. Appendix C. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the Commission in connection with the June 26, 1991 
Order, and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a 
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clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. TR. 38, 
54. She was interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store 
manager. Ms. McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per 
week at $3.35 per hour during her two weeks of part-time 
employment. TR. 54-55; Exhibit A-17. She performed cashiering, 
bookkeeping, customer service, and stocking shelves. TR. 56. 
She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application 
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" TR. 34. However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a 
heart condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in 
California in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and 
a racing heartbeat. TR. 31-32. Ms. McCord related that her doctor 
had informed her that the condition required no changes in 
lifestyle or employment. TR. 34. She was prescribed a "beta 
blocker," and she had no further difficulties. TR. 35-38. 
Both peirties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve 
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...*" TR. 
5; R. 30. 
Dr. Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and 
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems 
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7, TR. 103-
108. 
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some 
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. TR. 
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64-66. She asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the 
hospital to get her heart checked. TR. 67. Ms. McCord disclosed 
her mitral valve prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to 
questions. TR. 67. 
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms. 
McCord 's application for employment. No heart condition had been 
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms. 
McCord7s heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change 
of beta blocker. TR. 70-71. Although Ms. McCord called about two 
hours later, and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told 
to stay home and rest. TR. 72. 
It is not clear where the termination of employment took 
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took 
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was 
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same 
day as the hospital episode. TR. 145-146. During several of the 
discussions between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on 
that day, Ms. Jones stated that her mother had died from heart 
problems, and her son had recently had open heart surgery. During 
the termination discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the 
seriousness of Ms. McCord's heart problems. TR. 73. Ms. Jones 
then asked Ms. McCord why she did not disclose the heart condition 
on her application. Ms. McCord replied that she believed that it 
presented no restrictions on her, and that she did not consider it 
to be life threatening. TR. 74-75. Ms. Jones responded that she 
(Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave Ms. McCord in the store alone. 
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TR. 79. she then terminated Ms. McCord's employment. TR. 82. 
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms. 
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination 
in a typewritten attachment. R. 11. Exhibit A-4. This form and 
attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms. 
McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would 
have another medical episode under the stress created if she 
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told 
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful 
employment." Id. 
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD 
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was 
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress 
on th§ job and do her job accurately...." R. 12-14; Exhibit A-5. 
Again, it appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress 
factor. 
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were 
discussed: 1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump 
meters; TR. 231. and, 2) allegations that customers and employees 
had complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord/s breath during 
work. TR. 281, 285. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before 
working (TR. 154), and an employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash 
register till was accurate. TR. 231. Significantly, none of these 
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or 
were written on the termination form or attachment. TR. 90-95, 
162-163; Exhibit A-4. 
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There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from 
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord. TR. 186. 
Ms. McCord testified that she had sought to find work at 
"ninety to a hundred11 entities and places (TR. 110) , and introduced 
evidence that after her termination she attempted to find 
employment at 26 employment locations during 1989-1991. R. 27; 
Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short time as a janitor at an 
elementary school from November 1988 through January 1989. TR. 114. 
Although there was some testimony that Maverik employees had made 
unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord to other persons in the 
Vernal area (TR. 122-123), the ALJ found no direct evidence that 
Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms. McCord/s 
ability to seek other employment. R. 135; Appendix A, at 5. 
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that "Maverik 
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under 
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord." R. 136; Appendix A, at 
6. The ALJ based this conclusion on Maverik/s perception of Ms. 
McCord as handicapped. R. 136. 
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical 
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a phy-
sical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as 
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did 
'substantially limit major life activities only as a 
result of the attitudes of others toward such an im-
pairment. ...' 
R. 136; Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted. 
The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her 
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to 
perform the work. R. 137; Appendix A, at 6. 
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The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann 
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores: 
1. Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice in the nature of handicap discrimination. 
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practices. 
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to 
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with 
full rights, privileges and protections of employment. 
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for 24 
hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date of 
termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay 
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective 
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to 
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. 
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action as may 
be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by law. 
6. No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for having 
exercised her right to file this action. 
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to 
counsel for Ms. McCord. 
8. Maverik was to take any other applicable and reasonable 
relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her rightful 
position. 
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9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within 3 0 days of June 26, 
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, 
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or 
appeal unless such a filing were made. R. 139-140; Appendix A, at 
9-10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I 
Maverik should not be allowed to petition this Court in Docket 
Number 910413-CA because at the time of the petition the order of 
the ALJ dated June 26, 1991 was not final and Maverik had not 
exhausted its administrative remedies within the Commission. 
II 
Maverik claims that the orders of the Commission issued after 
Maverik had filed its petition in Docket Number 910413-CA were not 
valid. Maverik never asked for a stay of proceedings or for a stay 
of the Commission's order. Maverik continued to complete 
discovery, file motions and requests for reconsideration, and to 
otherwise use the administrative process. The doctrine of waiver 
may be invoked against Maverik. 
Ill 
Although Maverik claims that the Commission has created a 
"convoluted mess/1 Maverik certainly does not have clean hands in 
these two cases. Maverik raised a number of claims in this 
argument without specifying support in the record for them. These 
claims should therefore be dismissed. 
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IV 
Maverik claims that it was required to mail its filing to the 
Commission, and that it was allowed an additional three days for 
mailing. Mailing is allowed by the Commission, but documents not 
received within the required time are not considered filed within 
the meaning of that term, 
V 
Maverik claims that the Commission abused its discretion in 
not granting it a one day extension in which to file a request for 
review. The Commission nevertheless considered all of Maverik's 
claims. Maverik did not raise any good cause defense in its next 
request for reconsideration even though the Commission informed it 
that good cause was authorized as a defense to late filing. 
Maverik finally raised this defense in its "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration" which was denied as a matter of law under U.C.A. 
Section 63-46b-13(3)(b)(1953 as amended'1988). 
VI 
Maverik claims that it cannot determine damages owed to 
McCord. The ALJ clearly spelled out the damages which were 
relatively simple, i.e. providing only for back pay, attorneys' 
fees and costs along with other injunctive relief allowed to be 
imposed by the Commission. Although Maverik alleges that it cannot 
even compute the damages to make an estimate, Maverik was able to 
claim before* the ALJ that the attorneys' fees were vastly in excess 
of McCord's damages which it estimated to be in the range of 
$8,000. 
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VII 
Maverik claims that it has been deprived of its due process 
rights under the Utah Constitution, but has shown no prejudice 
other than vague claims. This is insufficient to show a denial of 
due process. 
ARGUMENTS 
The following issues are responses to those framed by Maverik. 
This Court should note that Maverik has raised more issues and some 
different issues that those which it framed in the issue section. 
I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT LOSE JURISDICTION TO ACT 
IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ORDER OF JUNE 26, 1991 
WAS NOT FINAL AND BECAUSE MAVERIK DID NOT EXHAUST 
ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO APPEALING TO THIS COURT 
This Court should dismiss the Maverik7s Petition for Review 
dated July 26, 1991 since the ALJ's order of June 26, 1991 was not 
final within the requirements of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14(1)(1953 
as amended 1988), and based on Maverik's failure to exhaust its 
administrative remedies in accordance with Section 14(2) of the 
same statute. 
This Court has recently spoken concerning the requirements for 
finality in the order of the agency involved. 
In Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 
(Utah App. 1989) (per curiam), the court 
concluded that 'an order of [an] agency is 
not final so long as it reserves something 
for the agency for further decision.' Id. 
at 464 ... The argument does not have merit. 
Petitioner confuses the requirement for exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies with the require-
ment for finality. The order in Heinecke revoking 
petitioner's license was clearly final because it 
reflected the determination on all issues before 
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the agency, and the issue before this court was 
whether all levels of agency review were complete 
at the time judicial review was sought. In con-
trast, as noted in Sloan, the requirement of fi-
nality contemplates that the agency proceedings 
have been brought to their conclusion by disposi-
tion of all issues before the agency. The denial 
of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to 
continue in the agency and is not a final order for 
purposes of judicial review. 
Barney v. Piv. of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
It was clear to Maverik that there were other issues 
which remained unresolved when the ALJ issued her first order on 
June 26, 1991. R. 312-313. Both Maverik and the adverse party 
Vicky McCord reserved the question of appropriate attorney/s fees, 
and agreed to address that issue in supplemental briefs to the 
Commission. Order, ALJ (June 26, 1991) at 9. In addition, 
McCord's counsel was ordered by the ALJ to "submit his brief on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this 
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if any, ... 
on or before twenty days thereafter." Id. at 10. This certainly 
shows no finality since there was a significant issue remaining for 
resolution. 
With regard to exhaustion of administrative remedies, the 
Commission respectfully requests this Court to revisit its decision 
in Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991). 
Heinecke determined that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
30 
(u,. < .A. .SMI'I IIIIV, ii i-'ji)U"j et seq. ) did not require a party to 
request administrative review of an order il the pert iiient agency 
statute -1 \'t contain language man id1 .nc] nwch r.. »iut>st Heinecke 
% L • - ithmit- +-b^  benefit .*; nt/i**t unj : > • }:• parti es, 
Heinecke, supra ^ * . 
Heinecke re]:c I . n-Countrv 
Homeowners v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 i x *•**« ii^ a;. ;989) to 
impliedly and expressly conclude that a party does no* have to 
request review wilhin uii a«jciK"| unless there is mandatory language 
in the agency's statutes requiring a party to request review where 
such review : a /ailable. 
oil Hi-Country is not required mv^^o 4 ~ -.-
language Hi-Country requiring the plain language tah 
Administrative Procedures Act (hereafter Act) to • " e 
pertinent language iroin the Act states: 
•••[A] party may seek judicial review only 
after exhausting all administrative reme-
dies .'available .... 
U,. C , A , Section *">3 4 6 b-1 'I ( ? ) (1 953 as amended 1988) (emphasis added). 
The current law also provides that: 
If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to 
seek review of an order by the agency • 
the aggrieved party may file a written re-
quest for review within 30 days after the 
issuance of the order with the person or 
entity designated for that purpose by the 
statute or rule. 
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U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988). 
Both of these two sections are substantially unchanged from 
the versions relied upon by the Utah Supreme Court. There is no 
reason for this Court to conclude from Hi-Country that U.C.A. 
Sections 63-46b-12(1)(a) and 14(2) cannot be read together to 
require Maverik to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to 
filing a judicial appeal. 
There is no language in the organic statutes for the 
Commission which provide that exhaustion is not required. In the 
absence of such language, exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
required. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14(2)(a)• 
There is absolutely no language in the ALJ's order which can 
be construed to state that Maverik is entitled to judicial review 
and that the order is a final order. In fact, the order shows that 
it is an order which was subject to becoming final and "not subject 
to review or appeal" only if Maverik did not exercise its right to 
request a Motion for Review by the Commission. R. 140. Maverik 
mistakenly or intentionally filed its request with this Court in 
violation of the requirements of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-
12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988) which allowed review by the full 
Commission. 
The rules promulgated by the Commission clearly state that 
orders "are not final Commission Orders ... until the Order is 
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a f f i i: in €5; d I i i a C < : in in i s s i o i i O r d e i: o i i r e v i ew per- Sc\:t ion * ** - 4 6 b -1 2 , 
U.C.A " This ruji'i and others were made * . tb* Commission under the 
authority of IJ. C ft. Section ~l4-3b-7 .1 ^ I ^ D J d 
P Sect i Jii J'l-Jt;-/ I (1.1) (a) u: atec* *-hat • < -H *; party 
may file a written request fo>- review * i • v;h * issued i *. 
presiding officer in accordanc n 
7 . I ( 1 1 ) (n) immediately fol ] ows Sections 34- *:>• - which 
sections ail refoi to formal adjudication hearings ;>,b0 * (Utah 
Admin, Code) , Thus, n it m 11< • wi : :i tt< . -:>terred 
to in Sectic? 34-is-7 1-i relates to a request for • view of 
the ALJ's decision concerning the formal proceedinc *. mg. 
S i n c e t lir* J ne-
 t
ii\i "Pi'ii on l t r v^ii'. iiiol •- •.* ime 
Maveri k fi 1 eel :i ts petition for review with this Court, and since 
Maverik did not exhaust its administrative remedies, 1ht»»i w*« D O 
juj" J Kd jot ioii ....n which lltn. nunl t.MuJd entertain Maverik's appeal 
of July 26, 1991. 
Assuming without conceding that the June ?b, ] my i onli'i wan -i 
f in*i it onloi , Mrivc I \Y wns required to exhaust its administrative 
remedies fay filing for a Motion for Review to the full Commission 
under Section 63-46b-12 (1951 as amended 19HH).. 
reasons, this Court should therefore dismiss 
the appeal in Docket Number 910413-CA, 
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II 
THE COMMISSIONS POWER TO ENTER 
ORDERS IN THIS CASE WERE NOT 
TERMINATED DUE TO LACK OF FINALITY, 
FAILURE OF MAVERIK TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES, AND MAVERIK'S FAILURE TO ASK 
FOR A STAY OR OTHER TEMPORARY REMEDY 
PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Maverik alleges that it "chose to appeal, and the Commission's 
power to enter to (sic) orders or reconsider terminated." The 
Commission will not rehash the lack of finality or exhaustion of 
administrative remedies arguments which it made in Argument I. The 
Commission will merely refer this Court to that Argument. 
Maverik argues that when the "issues in a main judgment are 
appealed, "the district court is indeed without jurisdiction as to 
them." It then cited Peters v. Peters, 394 P.2d 71, 73 (Utah 1964) 
as support for this argument. The Commission would point out that 
there was no question that the district court #s order in Peters was 
final. Of course, since the forum in Peters was a district court 
there was no requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted 
prior to appeal. 
The administrative agency is not equivalent to the district 
court, and, for example, because the Commission is involved in 
matters to protect the public health, safety, or welfare, the Act 
limits a Court's authority to issue a stay where the agency has 
declined to do so. This case does not appear to involve a 
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i hr^at i" onp ^ fho mentioned three areas, and there 
would have been M ^'-3SC. * -. u-<- 'agency not to issue nich a stay 
upon mot it i : • on tii"4 6b I8 ( "I) and 
mended 1988). 
Maverik ne *r requested the agency to stay its order -
* • -* - < ' ter i ts i n :i ti a] appeal to this Court 
July <w,
 t , >4 .tie i-i^ t specifically discusses allowing the agency 
jrant a stay during the pendency of judicial review. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other-
temporary remedy during the pendency of judi-
cial review, according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a 
stay or other temporary remedies unless extra-
ordinary circumstances require immediate judi-
cial intervention. 
... r\ I P / I W I Q ^ 3 as amended 1988); See also Rule 8, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1992). 
Not only did Mrivoi 11- mui i pqucst r " " , nut i \ wern on wi*->i 
it ts case bv . -o requesting discovery August 10, 1991 * 
reasonableness o 1 attorney fees and costs sought McCord. 
Maverik Brief at «i • li i acid i ti oi i, Mavei i k requested *~ •.- Commission 
to review the ALJ's June 26, 1991 order as well as her supplemental 
order of September 10, 1 991 I d Subsequently, Maverik IK""- ' "': •  r 
reconsiderat ion oi ironimi ssi oi i or der s on March 19, 1992 and Aprj • • , 
1992. Id. at 5. Maverik has never asked this Cour the 
Commission ^w ^t«^ uic Commission,s prucuudinqu o . • it 
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should not now be allowed to complain that the Commission had no 
authority to entertain its motions and requests. 
It can be argued that Maverik has waived its right to argue 
that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear its motions and 
requests for reconsideration based on the doctrine of waiver. 
Waiver is 'the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known 
right.' Id.; see Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 
1069, 1073 (Utah 1991); B.R. Woodward v. Collins Food Serv., 754 
P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988). To waive a right, there must be an 
existing right, knowledge of its existence, and an intent to 
relinquish it. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983); 
B.R. Woodward, supra. at 101. The intent to relinquish a right can 
be implied from conduct, if the party's conduct 'unequivocally 
evinces an intent to waive or [is] at least . . . inconsistent with 
any other intent.' Id. See Hunter, supra. at 432. 
For these reasons, the petitions of Maverik should be denied. 
Ill 
MAVERIK HAS CREATED THE DILEMMA 
IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF BY NOT 
PROPERLY FOLLOWING THE STATUTES 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Maverik alleges that the Commission "has created a convoluted 
mess." Mctverik Brief at 12. The Commission assumes that a 
"convoluted mess" is much worse that a "mess." The Commission 
agrees that the posture of these cases are troublesome, but that 
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tin-' MaitH" fiu.it.it Jic with Mr.wi') ik, and it,-; failure to understand and 
apply the procedural principles, statutes, and ru] es applying to 
administrative jaw and these cases. 
Tl le Commission wi 1 1 address procedural issues in th i s brief, 
without conceding thos<> areas • addressed - ;:t ommissior 
discussed by McCord. «ii:o a] 
and well a<= issues o^ >•:• merits. 
clear -eading the hyperbolic remarks pertaininq ^ 
misrepresents much m. Commissio ^ : •• .. ^ 
importantly shows that Maverik does not understand much u 
KMAIW i ii i b\\ t <i1 '. y . ' I J 11 I l i i i i «n I M . 
Significantly Maverik. has failed " reference us to 
documentary citation? support most of their - :*<• . *1 ion '"in pacfn-, 
nci Hie brief fails to minimally meet the 
requirements or h Le )) (Utah Rule? r Appellate Procedure (1992) 
which requires "citations - : uthor i *.  -J es , s t a I u U»s , . 11 ni pa 11 s 
of the recor cl i: e] :i ed oi i - Commission therefore requests the 
Court to disregard Maverik's unsupported and unreferenced 
assertions Ui s section. 
Althougi ^c ™- clear +-~ 4-1— Commission wherein Maverik 
finds support for ai ? i* . claims against the Commission, the 
Commissi Lssues which Maverik 
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asserts. The following Maverik claims on page 13 - 14 of its brief 
will be discussed. 
"[F]irst argued that no Request for Review by that 
agency was timely filed, refusing to consider that which was filed, 
even though the time limit for such a request is not 
jurisdictional." Maverik Brief at 13. Several of its claims are 
related to this issue. 
The gravamen of this claim appears to be that 
Requests for Review can be filed at any time, and that the 
Commission has no rules, statutes, or caselaw which would prevent 
it from reviewing the request. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as 
amended 1988) sets forth some requirements for filing which are 
jurisdictional, and can only be avoided upon good cause shown. 
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-l(9) (1953 as amended 1988). 
The first request for review of the June 26, 1991 
order was made by Maverik on October 11, 1991 which was outside the 
30 day requirement of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12, supra. R. 310-319; 
Appendix C. Although the Commission determined initially that 
Maverik's filing was untimely as to the June 26, 1991 order, the 
Commission did consider and respond to all of Maverik's contentions 
which Maverik raised in its October 10, 1991 request. Appendix D 
& F. Therefore, if the Commission did commit error as to whether 
the October 11, 1991 request for review was timely, it was 
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1 iar mless. See Coiiiiiii ssioi i (>:i : d e i , F eb 2 8 , 2 99 2 ; Appei id:i x F. 
Maverik gives the false impression that :i ts c] aims were ignored and 
not responded to. 
Si qui ! leant:!) , the Comrni ssi on d i d determine upon the 
request of Maverik oi I March . - }*•*< ~ \ reconsideration «-*- \ t 
February 28, 1992 order, thau uie uune • • L J 
was not fi na] because the issue of attorney fees w.is .tts«-i , e . 
Appendix P at 2, Maverik d i d not show any qood cause * >. ,iela, n 
either its request for rev :i ew of October 1 • • . t 
for reconsider a. t:i • :);n of Marcl i 1 9, 1992 . Append! - • yul see 
Appendix owever previously mentioned, the Commission did 
consj der • . *. . . 
Much « remainder Maverik1: riaims re.* at* : whether 
the Commission ^ »--r considerinq * requests * * ^. • * 1 » b e 
uirl line I y I . * v.««-t r a i s e d 
it HI several other issues * :t - arguments• 
For these reasons the appeals ui Maverik should be dismissed. 
THE REQUEST FOR REVIEW WAS 
UNTIMELY FILED, BUT IF THIS 
HONORABLE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY 
FILED, THE COMMISSION HAS 
CONSIDERED ALL OF MAVERIK'S 
CONTENTIONS, AND THIS ALLEGED ERROR 
IS HARMLESS 
If this Court determines that Maverik could legally file its 
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appeal of the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 to this Court without 
requesting review by the full Commission then this issue is not 
relevant. However, the Commission believes that this issue should 
be resolved cigainst Maverik. 
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988) requires 
that parties request review "within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for that 
purpose. ..." Issuance of the order has been determined by the Utah 
Supreme Court to be synonymous with the date of the order. Dusty 's 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 30, 1992). 
Section 12(1)(a), supra., in clear and unambiguous terms 
requires an aggrieved party to "file" its request for review within 
the required time limit. Courts distinguish between filing and 
mailing. Carter v. Utah Power and Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1096 
fn. 2 (Utah 1990). Thus, the Commission has generally treated a 
document as filed when it is received by the Commission. See 
generally Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mailing is 
therefore not the equivalent. 
The language asserted by Maverik to require parties to mail 
filings to the Commission has been conveniently misunderstood by 
Maverik. Maverik Brief at 18. 
Since the Commission informs the parties that they must file 
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f i 
M-. .<rdf. - JI .*:. , mambiguou. , : . o t n T s h o u l d •• ' :•* 
m i s u n d e r s t K; . A p p e n d i x p p e n d i ' . 
I I c ; • - • 1 »5 3 a s a i r t e i K i e d 1 "! * H 8 ) | » n > v i < J t" s , 
i n pertinent part, '" aggrieved party may fi] e a written 
request for rev iew within ^J days after the issuance ol the 
order •lf 
Rule 568-l-r; (Utah Admi ^ ,il< ~* ~* " wh ' i. iir' :os i* workers'' 
compensation cases, but not handicap UJLSCJIJU -.: cases, 
t .« "inent nari-! Whenever » nryH^p t « r paper 
requiring permitting some action behalf of a u<v t> .:. served 
on a partj HICILJL, uiree ua^ •**' • 
peri od a^ -.;.iov^ <i nndpr PI»1 * ;^ - *;tah Rules • . \;t 
Procedure, • There comparable provision 
I 
apply Rule siscrimination cases. 
Rule 6(e) M.<- I ^ Rules Procedure provides: 
"Whenev* : • ten Ju SUHIM,- acl or 
take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service 
of 'totice or cither paper upon him and the notice paper s 
HO lny added ^ e prescribed. 
period," 
Bonded Bicycle Couriers vs. Dept« of Employment Secuiity, 2o1 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1992), held that agency 
orders are "issued" on the date the document bears on its face, not 
the date they are mailed. 
To put all of these together, under Rule 6, a party gets three 
days for mailing jlf the time for him to take some action runs from 
the date of service. Under UAPA, the time to move for review runs 
from the date of issuance of the order, not service of the order on 
the parties. Thus, Rule 6 does not apply, and parties who would 
move for review of an ALJ's order do not get an additional three 
days for mailing. 
In this case, if this Court finds that Maverik was entitled to 
an additional three days under Rule 6(e)(Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure), then the Commission would argue that it has considered 
all of Maverik/s arguments which it set forth in its untimely 
filing, and there was therefore no harm to Maverik. 
For the above reasons, this Court should dismiss Maverik's 
appeals. 
V 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT MAVERIK'S REQUESTED ONE DAY 
EXTENSION 
The Commission concedes that Maverik has belatedly made out a 
4 2 
good case in its second request for i ocnis i doral ion based on ijood 
cause. Appendix G. However, Maverik did not do so in its first 
request for reconsideration which it submitted on March l i * . P 
response to the Commi ssioi i1" s or der of Febr oar: y 2 - *o. •- \ 
E. Maverik was informed .in that order of th« grounds : * . 
,n, s a s s e r t i o n ui lateness , and the requiremerr r. h v. 
good cause "^*" ^or some reason Mayor i k chose 
cause - ;? 4 ? request for reconsideration. 
i I i he Commission issued its order upon 
reconsideration on March 30, 1992, that Maverik subsequently stat* id 
'Limited Request Reconsideration" the grounds for good 
)iiii considered that Maverik 
had waived good cause, and had already addressed the alleged errors 
asserted by Maverik notwithstanding the lateness of M a v e r i k s 
Oct obPi 11, l(M!li I i 1 J nq , I In*' t.'omm i sa i < >n d ui mol respond, and 
allowed the "Limited Request for Reconsideration11 to be denied as 
a matter of lav Section 63-46b-13(3)(b)(1953 as amended 
1 9 8 8 ) •• ' v is (let-mcMl d<*jm.'d o n Apt i I 'I, ]'-»<•*,». 
Maverik's claim that thi -limited Request for Reconsideration" 
remains pending before the Commission is in, error because of the 
action < ' - .- in deny i i lg Mav er I k1 s i oquubl . 
For tlio reasons discussed,- the appeals of Maverik should be 
dismissed. 
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VI 
THE ALJ'S ORDER OF JUNE 2 6, 1991 
AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 10, 
1991 WERE SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC TO 
ADVISE THE PARTIES OF THE JUDGMENT 
AMOUNT 
Maverik asserts that the orders of the ALJ are not specific 
enough to determine the judgment amount. Maverik reasons that 
since no sum certain has been rendered that the remaining orders of 
the Commission are not valid. Maverik Brief at 20. 
Again, this issue was addressed by the ALJ in her orders, as 
well as by the Commission in its order of February 28, 1992. The 
orders of the ALJ are specific enough for the parties to be able to 
determine damages. The ALJ determined among other injunctive 
provisions that Maverik was to: 
1. Pay McCord back pay at a rate of $3.35 per hour for 
24 hours per week, or $80.40 per week from the date of termination 
through the date of the order which was June 26, 1991. Appendix A, 
Order, ALJ, June 26, 1991 at 8-9. McCord was to be credited with 
increases in the federal minimum wage effective April 1, 1990 to 
$3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour. R. 
138. 
2. McCord's back pay was to be reduced by all earnings of 
interim employment including Ashley Elementary School. R. 138. 
3. The ALJ awarded McCord attorney fees of $19,731, and 
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costs of $1,536,26. R. 323. 
Thus, the damages appear to be not difficult to compute for 
Maverik, and, in fact, Maverik has apparently estimated the entire 
amount of damages for McCord to be in the range of $8,000. See 
Appendix B, Supplemental Order, ALJ at 1; see also, TR. 254. Thus, 
Maverik's claim that it cannot even estimate the damages belies the 
facts. 
For these reasons, the appeals of Maverik should be dismissed. 
VII 
MAVERIK HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF 
ANY OF ITS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Maverik makes a vague and unsupported argument that it has 
been deprived of its constitutional rights. However, Maverik has 
given us no particulars on which to consider its allegations. 
Except for its assertion that it received no jury trial, Maverik 
has not shown how it was prejudiced. It claims that discovery is 
limited, but it has not shown how its case has been injured. It 
claims that the evidentiary rules are relaxed, but it again fails 
to show any harm. Maverik has failed to show why the hearing 
deprived it of due process. Lopez v. Career Serv. Rev. Bd. . 188 
Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah App. May 27, 1992). 
For the above reasons, the appeals of Maverik should be 
dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for review of Maverik in Docket Number 910413-CA 
should be dismissed due to lack of finality of the order of June 
26, 1991, and failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. The 
petition in Docket Number 920206-CA should be dismissed based upon 
either failure to timely file, or lack of meritorious claims. 
Alternatively, if the petition in Docket Number 910413-CA is 
allowed, then the petition for review in Docket Number 920206-CA 
should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEtfJAMIN A. SIMS 
/Attorney for Respondent 
/ Industrial Commission of Utah 
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APPENDIX A 
Administrative Law Judge's Decision of 6/26/91 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD Case No, 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 15, 
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The Charging Party was present and represented by 
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law. 
The Respondent was present and represented by 
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status 
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in 
connection with her termination of employment. The Charge was 
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24, 
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991 
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date 
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue. On February 15, 
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission 
on the Charge, and the request was granted. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn 
testimony and exhibits were presented. During the hearing, 
several rulings were made from the bench, including a denial of 
Respondent/s oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of 
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found 
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of 
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the 
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by 
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter 
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD 
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the 
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only 
binding agency action on the merits* The parties expressly 
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees 
following the issuance of an Order on the merits. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the 
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs. 
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fcict, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik 
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired 
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the 
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on 
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord7s position was 
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 per 
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment, 
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie 
Jenkins (Jenkins.) Her duties including cashiering, stocking 
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service. 
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment 
application (Exhibit A-l), which included a question concerning 
physical abilities: "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" McCord checked the box marked "no." 
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with 
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January, 
1988, while living in California. This diagnosis followed an 
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat. She 
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the 
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the 
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or 
employment. She was given a "beta blocker" medication and 
experienced no further problems. 
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the 
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into 
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said 
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a 
VICKY MC CORD 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
common and usually benign heart condition,.. An estimated 4 percent 
to 7 percent of the population has MVP. . . Because MVP is so common, 
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal 
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such." 
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined 
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk 
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job." 
(Exhibit A-7) Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve 
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work 
related endeavors." 
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon. 
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but 
felt some tightness in her chest and grew increasingly 
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go 
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones7 
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition. 
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention. 
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was 
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room 
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her 
"beta blocker" medication. After giving her a new prescription, he 
released her to return to work. 
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord7s 
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed. 
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not 
obtain any information. McCord called Jones approximately two 
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to 
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she 
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with 
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that 
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but 
she went on to say that Jones7 mother had died from heart problems, 
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that 
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord7s heart problem. 
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the 
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the 
termination of employment took place by telephone. In either 
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day 
concerning McCord7s heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she 
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord 
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on 
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it life-
threatening. Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones7 
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be 
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she 
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones' 
mother or son. Jones then terminated McCord's employment with 
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else." 
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee 
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which 
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances 
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part: 
I told her I would worry about her being on the job 
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then 
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had 
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the 
job. 
I alsso told her my sympathies were with her as my son had 
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died 
of heart problems and complications following surgery. 
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the 
interview when asked if she had medical problems that 
would interfere with her doing her job. 
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other 
less stressful employment. 
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in 
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision 
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the Anti-
Discrimination Division investigation. It states in pertinent 
part: 
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all 
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and 
do her job accurately... 
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her 
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A 
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not 
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for 
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with 
customers and running the cash register... 
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both 
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in 
a job that had a slower pace. 
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's 
job performance. Both Jones and Jenkins testified that McCord had 
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly. McCord 
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured 
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few 
weeks. Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers 
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work, 
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and they smelled it also, Jones stated that she asked McCord on 
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it. McCord 
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working* Jones and 
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register 
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy. 
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed 
job performance problems with McCord during the termination 
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of 
a heart problem. The Record of Employee Counseling which 
documented the termination did not state any other reason for 
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as 
"intoxication,lf "personal conduct," "unsatisfactory work 
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It 
also contains a statement that McCord/s performance was "average." 
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined 
McCord concerning the performance issues described above. 
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other 
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment 
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed 
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination. 
Respondents witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior 
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority 
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of 
her authority with regard to McCord. 
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other 
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she 
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 1989-
1991 (Exhibit A-8). She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary 
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She 
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was 
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the 
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements 
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal, 
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or 
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other 
employment. 
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones 
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord. She testified to 
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to 
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that 
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person, 
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otherwise qualified, because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6. 
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of 
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as 
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a 
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1). 
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment 
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F)(3). "'Is regarded as having an 
impairment' mecins (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as 
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as 
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or 
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of 
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such 
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6). 
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer 
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or 
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program," 
R486-1-2(J)(1). 
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited 
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord. 
Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord 
as handicapped. There was no evidence that McCord's actual 
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical 
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a 
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6) (a) and further, did "substantially 
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6)(c). 
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart 
conditions was shown to be discriminatory. McCord has met her 
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment, 
the termination was due to her employer's perception of her as 
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since 
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became 
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding 
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain 
medical advice about the perceived handicap — its symptoms, 
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before 
making the immediate decision to terminate. 
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because 
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical 
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge 
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this 
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's 
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed 
at both actual and perceived handicaps. This is a case where 
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional 
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on 
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself. 
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience 
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's 
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found. 
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws 
and regulations. Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent 
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her 
son. It would be absurd for the Commission to engage in an 
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career," 
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category 
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and 
McCord's employment was terminated. 
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the 
actual reason for termination. This is not supported by the 
evidence. Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate 
McCord's employment. The best evidence of her basis for this 
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time, 
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she 
gave McCord in the termination discussion. Both state the reason 
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that 
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that 
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and 
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since 
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones 
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions 
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for 
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that 
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even 
discipline, until the heart condition became known. 
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified 
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up 
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and 
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point. At 
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average." For 
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were 
lacking begs the question. 
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik/s 
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of 
wages and benefits of employment. Utah law states that if an 
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory 
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including 
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney,s fees," U.C.A. 
34-35-7.1(9). 
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for 
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay 
is calculated at a rate of $3.35 per hour for 24 hours per week, or 
$80.40 per week. The period of back pay runs from the date of 
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues 
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by 
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that 
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to 
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these 
incremental raises by passing the tests required. The 
Administrative* Law Judge does incorporate by reference the 
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80 
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for 
purposes of Ccilculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.) 
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay 
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley 
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only 
two months. A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that 
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay 
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim 
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the 
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the 
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore, 
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from 
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School. 
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the 
period of back pay since McCord's employment there was not 
terminated voluntarily. Consistent with case law enunciated in 
Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the 
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal 
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal 
convenience," Id. at 1278. Since McCord was required to quit 
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of 
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay 
award. 
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of 
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility 
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of 
these proceedings* The Administrative Law Judge finds that 
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that 
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed 
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be 
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity. 
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has 
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was 
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord 
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based 
on the evidence in the record. 
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's 
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in 
supplemental briefs to the Commission. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found 
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the 
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and 
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practices immediately; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full 
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment 
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full 
rights, privileges and protections of employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky 
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of 
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all 
lawful offsets due to interim employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take such 
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from 
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not 
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right 
to file this action; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a 
reasonable attorney,s fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject 
to both parties submitting written legal briefs on this question to 
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the Commission; McCord's counsel shall submit his brief on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this 
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if any, on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any 
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to 
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^frth day of ty.t^J 1991, 
ATTEST: 
^Tw^J €/ ./f/a 
Patricia O. Ashb^ 
Commission Secretary 
APPENDIX B 
Administrative Law Judge's Decision of 9/10/91 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. UADD 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
Charging Party, * 
vs. * 
KAVERIK COUNTRY STORE, * 
* 
Respondent. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case, 
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against 
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties 
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount 
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to 
U.CA. 34-35-7.1(9). Said briefs and supporting affidavits have 
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Lav Judge, who now 
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of 
attorney's fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50 
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the 
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work 
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen, 
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs 
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer 
time and copying. 
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees as 
claimed, and alleges that the fees are overstated and 
unconscionable. They note that the entire damage award to Ms. 
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed far 
exceeds that amount. 
The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the 
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of 
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She 
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of 
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d S56 (Utah 
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fcixifi 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's 
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U.CA. 34-35-7.1(9). 
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider in 
•warding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount 
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result 
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights, 
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary 
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra. "The total amount of attorneys 
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just 
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract," 
Cabrera at 625. 
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap 
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing. 
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required* Very limited 
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the 
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and 
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging 
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights, 
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the 
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division- The 
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful, 
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary 
range for the Salt Lake City legal community. Charging Party's 
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment 
discrimination law. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack 
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent 
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large 
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing 
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on 
attorney's fees. 
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative 
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing Arguments/ but herein 
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten 
closing arguments. Parties in an administrative hearing are 
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and 
closing statements orally at the bearing. Certainly it was not 
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation 
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor 
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of 
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forum, where 
judicial economy is a priority. 
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could 
not resist the urge to relitigate the hearing itself by submitting 
extensive written closing arguments• This is very understandable 
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing, 
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow 
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between 
counsel on even the smallest evidentiary matters. The 
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left 
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be re-
presented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of 
closing arguments. Unfortunately, this process required 34.10 
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 3 6.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's 
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure 
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation 
itself, and is found to be excessive. 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's 
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are 
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr. 
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed; 
of the 3 6.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, two-
thirds (24 hours) are disallowed. This leaves Mr. Stewart with 
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total 
compensable hours. 
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial 
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue 
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour «= 
$2,960.00. As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the 
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the 
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She 
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting 
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring 
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and 
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would 
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits. (Respondent's 
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal 
briefs contesting the award.) Claims of attorney's fees are 
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's 
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing 
and tabulating bills. The affidavits from other attorneys in 
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and 
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the A U . 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party'% 
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially 
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on 
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving 
16.45 total compensable hours-
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specifically 
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and are 
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right. 
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be related 
to the prosecution of this claim. They are not excessive and were 
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will be 
awarded as claimed. 
Finally, the Administrative Lav Judge rejects the argument 
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceeds 
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictly 
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to expect 
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigated 
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars. This is 
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel asserted 
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discrimination 
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render it 
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, and 
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment 
cases. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's 
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the 
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closing 
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees 
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shall 
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant 
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9)• 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store, 
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in 
connection with the handicap discriiriination claim before this 
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store, 
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in 
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this 
Commission, in the amount of $1,536.26. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors a: 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and n< 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Lav Judge 
Certified on this /^7^Q day of C^A^Z^/S , ) , 1991. 
ATTEST: 
Patricia O. Ashby ( f~^ 
Corliss ion Secretary-
r E R T l F l C ^ ° F r 1991, ^ 
I < ^ °ST toll*-** P* 
•^i HcCord
 v. St-e 
Ronald C. 
At torney
 t e s t 5 
^
7
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APPENDIX C 
Maverik's Request for Review of 10/11/91 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HEARING ROOM, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. O. BOX 510910 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151-0910 
UADD # 89-0031 
ooOoo 
VICKY ANN MCCORD 
Charging Party 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE 
Respondent 
ooOoo 
Respondent Maverik Country Stores, Inc. hereby requests a 
review by the full Commission of the "SUPPLIMENTAL ORDER" and 
the earlier findings, conclusions and order, issued on September 
10, 1991 and June 26, 1991 respectively. 
The errors in the September 10, 1991 order include 
whether the amount of attorney fees awarded is erroneously high, 
and whether it should bear some relation to the damages sought. 
As to both order, did the ALJ err in failing to determine 
the amount of damages? 
The errors in the June 26 Order, phrased as issues for 
4 * • • • 
< 5 ~ * * * • * f « . • 
» « « % ' « * * 
review, are as follows: 
I. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in awarding McCord lost 
wages for time periods after she acquired a better paying job, 
which she later quit? {Arbitrary and capricious or oppressive 
and unreasonable. Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regents, 595 P.2d 
481 (Utah 1979)}. 
II. Did the ALJ err in finding that Maverik treated McCord "as 
if" she were handicapped? (Substantial evidence test. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1989)}. Alternatively," was that finding arbitrary 
and capricious? {Hurst v. Board of the Indust. Com., 723 P.2d 
416 (Utah 1986)}. 
III. Did the ALJ incorrectly find that any perceived abnormality 
constitutes a perceived "handicap". {Correction of error 
standard — review for correctness of statutory interpretation. 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 
1988)}. 
IV. Did the ALJ err in finding that clerking at a convenience 
store is a "major life activity" under the facts of the case? 
{Rational basis and reasonableness, applying law to facts, Dept. 
of Air Force v. Dept. of Emplmt. Sec, 786 P.2d 1361 (Utah App. 
1990)}. 
V. Was it error to find handicapped discrimination when no 
medical expert was called to testify? {Substantial evidence 
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}. 
VI. Did the ALJ err in not ruling that McCord cannot prevail, 
since she has not produced substantial evidence that she was 
"otherwise qualified" to act in the job. {Substantial evidence 
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}. 
- 2 -
Authorities respecting issues on review. 
R486-1-3CF)(1),(3),(4) and (6), Utah Admin. Code-
§ 34-4-2(9), Utah Code 
§ 34-35-1, et seq., Utah Code. 
§ 34-35-6(a)(i), Utah Code. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 637 (Utah 
1983). 
Maverik's Trial Brief is attached, and its arguments are 
all incorporated by reference. ?-)td— 
Respectively Submitted this / day of October, 1991. 
7?2>kfi~4^ 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
David C. Cundick 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Benjamin Sims of the Commissionf &pd^ to James W* Stewartf 
counsel for claimant McCordf on the /0 -—-day of Octoberf 1991 f 
at 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101. 
7nA >^&< 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX D 
Industrial Commission's Order of 2/28/92 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD CASE NO, 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
vs. * REVIEW 
* 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE, * 
Defendants. * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for 
Review of the administrative law judge's Order dated June 26, 1991 
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for review is 
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12. 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a 
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was 
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms. 
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A-
17) . She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and 
stocking shelves. 
She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application 
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart 
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in California 
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing 
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her 
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment. 
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further 
difficulties. 
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve 
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr. 
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and 
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems 
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7. 
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some 
tightness in heir chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She 
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to 
get her heart checked. Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve 
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions. 
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms. 
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been 
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms. 
McCord/s heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change 
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later, 
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home 
and rest. 
It is not clear where the termination of employment took 
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took 
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was 
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same 
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions 
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms. 
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her 
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination 
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of 
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why 
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application. Ms. 
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions 
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening. 
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave 
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord's 
employment. 
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms. 
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination 
in a typewritten attachment. Exhibit A-4. This form and 
attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms. 
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McCord/s heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would 
have another medical episode under the stress created if she 
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told 
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful 
employment.,f Id. 
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD 
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was 
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress 
on the job and do her job accurately...." Exhibit A-5. Again, it 
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor. 
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were 
discussed: 1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump 
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had 
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during 
work. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms. 
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash 
register till was accurate. Significantly, none of these 
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or 
were written on the termination form or attachment. 
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from 
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord. 
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her 
termination she attempted to find employment at 2 6 employment 
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short 
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988 
through January 1989. Although there was some testimony that 
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord 
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct 
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms. 
McCord's ability to seek other employment. 
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that "Maverik 
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under 
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord." The ALJ based this 
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped. 
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical 
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a phy-
sical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as 
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did 
'substantially limit major life activities only as a 
result of the attitudes of others toward such an im-
pairment. . . . ' 
Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted. 
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The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her 
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to 
perform the work. 
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann 
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores: 
1. Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination. 
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practices. 
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to 
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with 
full rights, privileges and protections of employment. 
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for 
24 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date 
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay 
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective 
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to 
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. 
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action 
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by law. 
6. No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for 
having exercised her right to file this action. 
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to 
counsel for Ms. McCord. 
8. Maverik was to take any other applicable and 
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her 
rightful position. 
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26, 
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, 
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or 
appeal unless such a filing were made. 
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ISSUE ONE 
WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES 
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW? 
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then 
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on 
September 10, 1991. The Reguest for Review by Maverik was received 
by the IC on October 11, 1991. This reguest was not received 
within the 3 0 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26, 
1991, as reguired by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause 
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
Thus, the order of June 26, 1991 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and 
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the 
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b). 
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related 
to attorney/s fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review 
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on 
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a 
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-12. 
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to: 
File a written request for review within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order with the person 
or entity designated for that purpose by the sta-
tute or rule. 
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a 
written request for review within 3 0 days. . .with the person. . .ff and 
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is 
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 3 0 day 
period, the nature of issuance must be determined. 
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance, 
but what little there is indicates that issuance of an order is 
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synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnvside Nurseries, Inc. v. 
Agri. Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 C.A.3d 922. 
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10, 
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date. 
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to 
file. This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) 
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative 
process. 
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11, 
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day 
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss 
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the 
parties. 
ISSUE TWO 
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY 
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION 
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?" 
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other 
actions, award attorneys' fees and costs. The ALJ awarded Ms. 
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord 
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the IC. 
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were 
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages 
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which 
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal 
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the 
work of three eittorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane 
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively. 
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately 
preceding paragraph. 
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce 
the award based on case law which identified the following key 
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of 
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the 
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit 
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
customary fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of 
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the attorneys involved. Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep. 
10, 1991). 
Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately 
$8,000, and that the attorney's fees are excessive when that 
recovery is considered. The amount in controversy is a factor 
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination 
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one 
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. Cf. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). 
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the 
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the 
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys 
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms. 
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since 
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause 
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms. 
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment 
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were 
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community. 
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction 
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note 
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate. 
For the above reasons, we find the attorney's fees awarded to 
Ms. McCord's attorneys to be appropriate in light of the 
documentation, expertise and work required in her case. 
ISSUE THREE 
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN 
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT 
OF DAMAGES? 
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but 
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ 
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time 
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later 
quit?" 
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the 
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial. 
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984); Wells v. North 
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Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983) 
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ 
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination 
until the date of her order. 
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of 
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C. 
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make 
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The 
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms. 
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1278 
(4th Cir. 1985). We can find nothing in the file which shows that 
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss. When she left her 
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness 
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by 
reducing Ms. McCord's award by all earnings from interim 
employment, including her elementary school job. 
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in 
light of the entire record. 
ISSUE FOUR 
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE 
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED 
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED? 
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik 
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found 
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of 
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991). 
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral 
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no 
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for 
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991). 
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-35-
6(1)(a)(i) which states in pertinent part: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or 
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, ... 
because of ... handicap .... 
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived 
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by 
the UADD under the authority of U.C.A. 34-35-5(b), and provides 
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that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a 
handicap where the individual: 
Has a record of such an impairment . . . or has 
been regarded as having, a mental or physical 
impairment .... 
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code). 
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the 
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think 
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to 
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah 
Admin. Code) . A person who has no disability or handicap, but who 
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of 
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by 
others as one who is actually impaired. 
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms. 
McCord's employer's perception of her as handicapped, and that she 
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer 
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived 
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's 
perceived medical condition. 
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is 
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct. 
ISSUE FIVE 
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY 
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED 
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES 
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP? 
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived 
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates 
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required. 
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's 
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the 
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the 
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting 
one or more of a person's major life activities. 
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment 
because of a handicap...." R486-1-2F3 (Utah Admin. Code). 
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A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she 
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a 
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the 
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of 
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental 
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment. 
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code). 
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of 
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition. Ms. McCord's 
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was 
treated as a serious one by Maverik. A job is a major life 
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is 
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless 
undue hardship can be shown. 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the 
requirements of law in light of the whole record. 
ISSUE SIX 
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS 
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE 
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION 
CAN BE MADE? 
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve 
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-ll would 
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse...." 
Exhibit A-ll. Having stipulated that this exhibit would be 
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no 
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before 
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but 
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence 
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her 
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart 
problem, and as a result fired her. 
No medical expert was required. 
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ISSUE SEVEN 
WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT 
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE 
JOB? 
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was 
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time 
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated 
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination, 
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik 
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination. 
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was 
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her 
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones, 
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the 
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the 
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day 
of her termination alone for most of her shift. 
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not 
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas 
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that 
everyone had problems reading the pump meters. Ms. McCord 
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the 
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the 
till. 
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing 
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the 
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to 
that point. 
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find 
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the 
whole record. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge 
dated June 26, 1991, and September 10, 1991 are affirmed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-4 6b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
:ephen M. Hadley"~\ 
ChaiVjnan 
DntasA 
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VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic), 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
UADD Case No. 89-0031 
TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH: 
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its "Order Denying Review", issued on February 28, 1992. 
This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code. 
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows: 
1. The Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-
1(9) to make the filing of Maverik1s Petition for Review untimely, 
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending 
any such deadline. The statute expressly applies only to time 
1 
periods "established for judicial review." It does not apply to 
agency review, 
2. To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one 
day extension to petition for review by the Commission. 
3. The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that 
the June 26, 1991 order of the ALJ was final. Issues were 
specifically and expressly reserved in that order (including 
attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated. The order 
was comparable to a partial summary judgment, which cannot be 
appealed to the next judicial level so long as issues remain 
undetermined. So long as the agency's order reserves anything to 
the agency for further decision, it is not a final order. Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
4. Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission 
to review it could not have been tardy. 
5. While the commission acknowledges that the amount of 
recovery is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness, 
its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect 
the amount of recovery had in this case. See Order Denying Review, 
page seven. 
6. Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be 
evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture, 
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor 
2 
can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has 
entered to date, 
7. The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in 
announcing how the damages could be calculated. It did so based on 
assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing 
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect. Damages 
simply cannot be calculated without further hearing and 
supplemental findings. 
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the 
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have 
been treated "as if" she were "handicapped." See, e.g. Salt Lake 
City v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley v. Board 
of Review, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
For all of the above reasons, Maverik requests that the 
Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992. 
R'ondld C. Bairker, Mitchell R. 
Barker and David C. Cundick 
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 44580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Benjamin A. Sims 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX F 
Industrial Commission's Order on Reconsideration 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600 
CK 
• 
VE: 
Y ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
RIK COUNTRY STORES, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER DENYING 
REQUEST FOR RE-
CONSIDERATION 
UADD No. 89-0031 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the 
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on 
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority 
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for 
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons: 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has 
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of 
Maverik's Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of 
the Commissions discretion in extending any such deadline. This 
section states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
VICKY ANN MCCORD 
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review, 
(Emphasis added). 
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten 
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the 
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown, 
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its 
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to 
judicial reviejw as asserted by Maverik. We therefore reject 
Maverik's first issue. 
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for 
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected 
based on failure of Maverik to show good cause. 
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was 
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and 
damages were not calculated. Upon further review, we agree that 
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attor-
ney fees was reserved by the following language: 
The parties reserved the question of an ap-
propriate attorney's fees award, pending 
this Order, and shall address that in sup-
plemental briefs to the Commission. 
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). 
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the 
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final 
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by 
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the 
Commission should extend the filing time. 
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final 
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of 
Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find 
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages 
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement 
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight 
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the 
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are 
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listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination, 
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five. 
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated. 
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the 
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the 
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Request for Reconsideration of 
defendant is dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
. ^ W V ^ ^ J L -
epneryjM. Haalev, 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this (B^^day of 
^7?^i^U 1992 • 
ATT^T: 
<D 
Patricia O. Ashbyj 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on Vicky Ann McCord, Case 
No. 89-0031 on 30 March 1992 to the following: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910413-CA 
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BENJAMIN A. SIMS 
APPENDIX G 
Maverik's "Limited Request for Reconsideration 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
LIMITED REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. ; 
| Case Number: UADD 89-0031 
MAVERIK COUNTY STORES, 
Respondent, 
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its denial of Maverik1s request that the Commission 
lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the 
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge, which was issued on or about September 10, 1991. This 
request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is 
limited to a request for review of the denial of an extension of 
time. 
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The grounds for relief from the Order are: 
1. The procedural events in this matter to date are as 
follows: 
a. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued, 
reserving attorney fee issue for later determination, June 26, 
1991. 
b. Supplemental Order awarding approximately $20,000 in 
attorney fees and costs issued by the Administrative Law Judge, 
September 10, 1991. 
c. Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991 
but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day 
after Columbus Day). 
d. Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding 
in part that Maverikfs Motion for Review was untimely, February 28, 
1992. 
e. Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992, 
including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August 
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review. 
f. Commission issues Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, including denial of Maverikfs request that the 
time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30, 
1992. 
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2. Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see 
below) . The good cause previously shown was the fact that the 
document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991, 
which is the due date by statute. 
3. Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any 
time period for action by the Commission "for good cause shown". 
4. The Commission has, for the first time in its Order 
Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order. See, 
Order Denying Reconsideration, March 30, 1992, page 2. This 
changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate 
review of all the matters at issue. The Commission having 
determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters 
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of 
the ALJfs original order. 
5. Further good cause for the extremely short extension 
request that is shown as follows: 
a. Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik 
under law. They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as 
October 14, Columbus Day. 
b. As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review, 
page 5 and 6, there is little case authority construing what 
constitutes "issuance11 by the Commission. It is also far from 
3 
clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission. Because of 
these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of 
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when 
requested in good faith. 
c. The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by 
Maverik was received by counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12, 
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the 
Petition for Review. 
d. At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order, 
and just prior to Maverik*s counsel receiving the same, the 
undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis 
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and 
which did start) on September 16, 1991. The case was State of Utah 
vs. Stephen Cartisano and Challenger Foundation II, 90-CR-47, Sixth 
Circuit Court, Kane County. 
e. From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until 
September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is 
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at 
the formal hearing in this matter with Mr. Barker, were both 
involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well 
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah. Little time was 
taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items 
received in the mail. 
4 
f. September 18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's 
counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in 
a mistrial. The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in 
May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City. 
g. The undersigned had another trial on October 3, 1991 
before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several 
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period from 
September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's 
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed. Those 
included several days trying to catch up on office work after the 
Cartisano. 
h. On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and 
hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00 because 
virtually the entire day was spent researching and arguing before 
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue 
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County 
to Salt Lake County. 
6. Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the 
due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather 
than hand filed. That section states that the request shall "state 
the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by mail to the 
presiding officer and to each party". See also Section 63-46b-
1(9), Utah Code. 
5 
7. This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or 
a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider. An 
enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year, 
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992. 
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here 
further shown for the very short extension sought be Maverik to 
make its Petition for Review of the Supplemental Order timely, 
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received 
shortly thereafter by the Commission. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992. 
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I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of April, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James W. Stewart 
Kay C. Krivanec 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Benjamin Sims 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
g^L/f^LX 
6 
